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ABSTRACT 
Unignited hydrogen release from 700 bar onboard storage in a naturally ventilated covered car park has 
been simulated and analysed. A typical car park with dimensions LxWxH=30x28.6x2.6 m was 
considered. The car park had two vents of equal area on opposing walls: front and back to facilitate cross-
flow ventilation based on the British standard (BS 7346-7:2013). Each vent had an area equal to 2.5% of 
the car park floor area, in line with BS 7346-7:2013 and similar international standards. Releases through 
three different Thermally Activated Pressure Relief Devices (TPRD) diameters of 3.34, 2.00 and 0.50 mm 
were compared, to understand the gas dispersion, specifically the dynamics of the flammable envelope 
(4% vol H2), and envelopes of 1% and 2% H2 as these are relevant to sensor and ventilation system 
activation as required by NFPA 2 standard for enclosures.  Concentrations in the vicinity of the vehicle 
and of the vents are of particular interest. A blowdown model developed in Ulster University was applied 
to simulate realistic scenarios, and a comparison between an idealistic constant flow rate release and 
blowdown through a 3.34 mm TPRD diameter highlighted the conservative nature of a constant flow rate 
release. However, even accounting for the blowdown demonstrated that a release through a TPRD 
diameter of 3.34 mm leads to the formation of a flammable cloud throughout the majority of the carpark 
space in less than 20 s. Such a flammable envelope is not observed to the same extent for a TPRD 
diameter of 2 mm and the flammable envelope is negligible for a 0.5 mm diameter TPRD. Based on 
ISO/DIS 19880-1, NFPA 2 and IEC (60079-10) standards for equipment with gaseous hydrogen, the 
ventilation system must work to maintain hydrogen concentration under 1% of hydrogen mole fraction in 
the air, above this there should be ventilation sensor activation. Whilst a release through a 2 mm TPRD 
diameter resulted in concentrations of 1% hydrogen along the length of the car park ceiling within 20 s, in 
contrast an upward release through a 0.5 mm diameter led to concentrations of 1% reaching a very limited 
area of the ceiling. The simulations comparing an upward and downward release through a 0.5 mm TPRD 
demonstrated the effect of release direction on hydrogen dispersion. However, this effect is not as 
pronounced as the effect of changing TPRD diameter. It can be concluded that onboard vehicle storage 
with a TPRD diameter of 0.5 mm appears to be inherently safer for the scenario considered, as opposed to 
“typical” larger diameter TPRDs which the study indicates should be carefully investigated to ensure 
safety in a naturally ventilated covered car park. 
KEYWORDS: Unignited release, covered carpark, hydrogen safety, indoor dispersion, natural 
ventilation. 
INTRODUCTION 
The number of hydrogen-powered vehicles on the market is growing and it is important to ensure 
they are at least as safe as conventional vehicles. Onboard hydrogen is typically stored as a 
compressed gas under high pressure (35 MPa for buses and 70 MPa for cars) and storage tanks are 
fitted with Thermally Activated Pressure Relief Devices (TPRD) to release hydrogen, avoiding tank 
rupture when the surrounding temperature reaches 110oC or above. In the event of a TPRD 
Proceedings of the Ninth International Seminar on Fire and Explosion Hazards (ISFEH9) 
1408 
activation, the released hydrogen might not ignite, instead of forming a flammable atmosphere and 
an explosion may occur in the presence of an ignition source. The potential delayed ignition and 
explosion event will not be explored in this study which instead focuses on release and dispersion. 
Failure of a TPRD or a fire on the opposite side of the tank has potential to cause an unignited 
release, it is this potential unignited release from a TPRD, in a covered car park which is discussed 
here. By necessity, hydrogen vehicles will be parked indoors, in garages, underground car parks, 
and present in tunnels, etc. Unignited hydrogen releases in an enclosure have been covered in the 
literature to a certain extent. However, with the exception of the work by Houf et al. [1], who 
considered releases from forklifts in warehouses, to date, the emphasis of numerical studies has 
tended towards low release rates and/or smaller enclosures. For instance, Venetsanos et al. [2] 
undertook an inter-comparison of CFD models in 2009 to investigate the model capability to 
reproduce hydrogen dispersion in a garage for a 1 g/s release from a 20 mm leak diameter in a 78.38 
m3 enclosure with two 5 cm diameter vents on one wall. In 2010, Papanikolaou et al. [3] assessed 
numerically the ventilation requirements for a residential garage with onboard hydrogen storage. In 
2013, Bernard-Michel et al. [4] performed an inter-comparison of CFD models for a 4 Nl/min 
helium release in a 1 m3  enclosure with 1 cm circular vent at the base of one wall. Molkov and 
Shentsov [5] validated the CFD model for buoyant hydrogen releases against the experimental study 
of Cariteau and Tkatschenko [6] for a small laboratory scale enclosure. When considering unignited 
releases in an enclosure, both the concentration decay and overpressure may be of interest. Free jets 
have been previously studied at Ulster and a nomogram is presented in Molkov [7, 8] to calculate 
hydrogen concentration decay in a jet. Li et al. [9] numerically investigated unignited and ignited 
releases from a 4.2 mm diameter TPRD under the car in the open air and it was concluded that the 
hazard distance for the unignited releases was somewhat longer than those for the ignited release. 
Previous numerical and analytical work by the authors on unignited releases indoors have been 
focused on momentum-dominated releases in enclosures with minimum ventilation, leading to the 
pressure peaking phenomenon [10-13]. However, in order for pressure peaking phenomenon to 
occur the release and enclosure geometry must be such that no air ingress occurs into the enclosure. 
Whilst this is relevant to residential garages, pressure peaking will not be caused by releases from 
typical TPRD diameters in car parks with the minimal ventilation legally required. To date, little or 
no publications exist on hydrogen unignited releases in car parks. 
Ventilation recommendations exist to minimise the potential formation of a flammable atmosphere 
within an enclosure. Ventilation systems should be able to keep hydrogen concentration below the 
lower flammability limit (LFL) of 4% vol in order to eliminate potential ignition and flame 
propagation with pressure build up. Indeed, standards typically recommend concentrations do not 
exceed fractions of the LFL. Standards ISO/DIS 19880-1 [14], NFPA 2 [15] and IEC (60079-10) 
[16] require that the ventilation rate should ensure a maximum hydrogen mole fraction at 25% of 
the LFL for enclosures and buildings containing hydrogen equipment, i.e. 1% vol in the case of 
hydrogen. As an increasing number of car parks are built the majority are constructed in the 
basement of residential and commercial buildings [17]. In the literature, both underground car parks 
and those with two or more sides and a roof are referred to as covered car parks. Previous studies 
have focused on car fires in a car park and the amount of heat released from such a fire [18]. For 
example, the smoke movement and fire spread were numerically investigated by Zhang et al. [19] 
for an underground car park containing three burning cars. Joyeux et al. [20] indicated that the 
majority of fires in covered car parks involve only one car with the exception of the Schiphol fire 
accident, where around 10 to 30 cars were engulfed with fire. The difference in ventilation 
approaches should also be noted, with only wind and buoyancy the influencing factors where 
natural ventilation is considered. There are no existing studies, either experimental or numerical 
investigating safety aspects of an unignited hydrogen release in a large confined space such as a 
naturally ventilated covered car park. The release of hydrogen through a TPRD, dispersion and 
potential accumulation should be investigated to understand the potential hazards, helping to 
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address potential safety issues. Such an investigation is necessary and in the public interest and 
hence is the subject of this paper.  
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
This work focuses on an unignited hydrogen release in a naturally ventilated covered car park. CFD 
is used to provide insight into the flow process, including the prediction of flammable zone 
formation, temperature gradient, and flow patterns inside the covered car park. A typical covered 
car park has been simulated with dimensions of LxWxH=30x28.4x2.6 m as can be seen in Fig. 1 
(ceiling is not shown). The car park has two ventilation openings: a back vent and front vent. They 
have an equal area but differ in shape. The front vent consists of a top to the bottom opening to 
drive through and two smaller connected side vents near the car park ceiling, representing an area 
typical of “door with two side vents”. In contrast, the back vent is located on the top centre of the 
back-wall opposite to the front vent. The ventilation requirements were accounted for based on 
British Standard BS 7346-7:2013 [21] where it is recommended that a covered car park with natural 
ventilation should have an opening area equivalent to 5% of the floor area for each floor in a level. 
Similarly, the standard in the Netherlands NEN 2443 [22], requires vents area equivalent to 2.5% of 
the floor area on each opposite wall (5% in total). Thus, the two vents considered were of equal area 
(21.45 m2) and located on opposite walls.  
 
Fig. 1. Sketch of the naturally ventilated covered carpark with car geometry. Insert highlights TPRD location. 
Six scenarios were considered by varying TPRD diameters and release type, these are listed in 
Table 1. The under-expanded jet theory developed at Ulster University [23] was used to calculate 
the equivalent diameter for the leak inlet (notional nozzle), thus avoiding the need to resolve the 
shock structure of the real jet at the TPRD exit. The car volume was not considered in 4 of the 6 
cases. This allowed a safer diameter to be determined independent of car geometry. The release in 
these cases was located exactly at the centre of the car park at a position 0.5 m above the floor. 
However, a car geometry was considered for two scenarios with a release through a 0.5 mm TPRD 
diameter where release direction and position on the car was assessed. A typical saloon car with 
dimensions of 4.9 m length, 1.88 m width, and 1.47 m height was chosen. It was assumed that the 
car was stationary at the time of the leak and the onboard hydrogen tank was filled to capacity. This 
allows investigation of the worst case scenario. The hydrogen tank was assumed to have a volume 
of 117 litres and storage pressure of 70 MPa, with a capacity of approximately 5 kg. It was assumed 
that the car body is 0.25 m above the ground, with “square” wheels representing the actual 
equivalent circular diameter.  
There are two possibilities for TPRD location: underneath the car close to the rear left the wheel or 
Proceedings of the Ninth International Seminar on Fire and Explosion Hazards (ISFEH9) 
1410 
the upper rear of the car close to back windshield facing upwards. These two scenarios have been 
considered in this study and it was assumed that both were located to the left side of the car with the 
same horizontal coordinates but differing height, (1.47 and 0.25 m from the floor respectively). The 
centre of the leak was situated in the centre of the car park, meaning the car body was positioned 
slightly left of centre. The ambient temperature and pressure were taken as 293 K and 101325 Pa 
respectively, and the fully quiescent conditions were considered, i.e. no wind effects, replicating a 
car park located in an urban setting. It is noted that a TPRD release is likely to result in an ignited 
release when it is triggered by a high temperature, and this is the subject of ongoing studies by the 
authors. However, the malfunction of a TPRD or activation through impact, warrants investigation, 
particularly with standard ventilation requirements based on gas concentrations. 
Table 1. Scenarios considered for unignited hydrogen release in a naturally ventilated covered car park 
Case 
number 
Real release diameter 
(Notional nozzle 
diameter) (mm) 
Release 
direction 
Car 
geometry 
Blow-
down 
model 
Hydrogen 
mass flow 
rate (kg/s) 
1 3.34 (56.4) Upward No No 0.2993 
2 3.34 (56.4) Upward No Yes 0.2993 
3 2 (33.8) Upward No Yes 0.1072* 
4 0.5 (8.44) Upward No Yes 0.0067* 
5 0.5 (8.44) Upward Yes Yes 0.0067* 
6 0.5 (8.44) Downward Yes Yes 0.0067* 
* Value at the initial stage, before blow down. 
MODEL AND NUMERICAL APPROACH 
Overview 
The CFD package ANSYS Fluent [24] was the base software tool used to simulate this high-
pressure hydrogen release scenario. Whilst this study is timely and needed to inform the 
development of RCS, no previous work exsists on hydrogen releases in carparks, and as such there 
is no experimental data. Indeed there is limited experimental data for high pressure impinging 
hydrogen jets at a large scale. Indeed it is hoped that this work can thus assist in addressing 
hydrogen safety issues regarding large size enclosures with vents. ICEM CFD was used to generate 
the geometries and hexahedral meshes, with ANSYS Fluent to solve the governing equations. A 
pressure-based solver has been used and PISO (Pressure Implicit with the Splitting of Operators) 
was applied in this study for transient flow calculations. The compressible flow was considered, and 
second-order upwind schemes have been used for all spatial discretisation, with the exception of the 
pressure gradient where the PRESTO! interpolation method was applied. A least-squares cell-based 
approach was used for interpolation methods (gradients). Heat transfer by conduction, convection, 
and radiation was accounted for as described in previous work by the authors [10, 25]. 
Governing equations 
The Reynolds-Average Navier-Stokes (RANS) conservation equations were considered solving 
mass, momentum, energy, and species, 

 + 	 = , (1) 
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where ? is the time, ! is the density,  k represents turbulence kinetic energy,   is  the turbulent 
dynamic viscosity, ) is the pressure,  is the source term which can be added by user define 
function (UDF),  & represents the velocity components, ( is the total energy,  is the Kronecker 
symbol, @ is the specific heat at constant pressure, " is the gravitational acceleration, @  and AB  are the turbulent Schmidt and energy turbulent Prandtl numbers, which are 0.7 and 0.85 
respectively, ; is the mass fraction, 6 is the molecular diffusivity of the species m, # are the 
source terms in the energy equation, > and   are the net production/consumption rate by species F chemical reaction and the source term connected to any functions defined by the users for 
dispersed phase. 
Turbulence model 
The realizable k-ε turbulent model [25] was considered to solve the transport equation for 
turbulence kinetic energy (,) and turbulent dissipation rate (G): 
H
 + 	 !,& = 	 I% + -.J* H	 K + LH + LM − ! G − ; + H, (5) 
 N
 + 	 !G& = 	 I% + -.JO* N	 K + !PQG − !P N
R
HS√UN − PQN NH PN  LM + N , (6) 
where, ; is the contribution of the fluctuating dilatation in compressible turbulence to the overall 
dissipation rate, LM and LH are the buoyancy and the mean velocity gradient respectively, which 
presents the , generation, V is the kinematic viscosity, WH and WN are the Prandtl numbers of 
turbulence for , and G, corresponding to 1 and 1.2. PN is calculated as a function of the flow 
velocity components with respect to the gravitational vector while P and PQN are constants 1.90 and 
1.44 respectively. PQ is evaluated as a function of the modulus of the mean rate of the strain sensor, . H is a source term to be defined by User Define Function (UDF) for Turbulence Kinetic Energy 
while N represents a UDF source term for turbulence dissipation rate, which was calculated from 
blowdown parameters via a  UDF in this study. This model outperforms the standard κ-ε model 
especially for calculating spreading rate in axisymmetric jets [24,27]. 
Boundary and initial conditions 
A domain with outer dimensions 170x 128.6 x 92.6  m (LxWxH) was used, which is axisymmetric 
lengthwise. A hexahedral mesh was generated throughout the domain, details of which are given 
later in this paper. The walls were not meshed in depth. The car park floor, walls, and the roof had a 
thickness of 0.15 m and were assumed to be constructed of concrete, and the release pipe or car 
body was considered to be made of aluminium.  The material properties chosen are similar to 
concrete typically used for car parks in the UK. Two materials were used in this study: aluminium 
and concrete, and the details of the material properties can be found in a previous publication [25]. 
A box mesh technique with mesh interfaces was implemented to provide a refined mesh around the 
nozzle and inside the car park, making it possible to improve resolution without a significant 
increase in total number of control volumes. A no-slip condition was applied at the solid surfaces. 
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The domain was assumed to be initially 100% air at normal ambient pressure and temperature 
(101325 Pa and 293 K respectively).  
Notional nozzle model and blowdown process 
Hydrogen released from a 70 MPa tank through a TPRD forms an under-expanded jet, leading to a 
complex shock structure at the nozzle exit, which is computationally intensive to capture. It is not 
necessary to solve this shock structure in this work as it is not the focus of this study. Therefore, the 
notional nozzle theory developed by Molkov et al. [23] and described in detail in [8] has been 
applied. In addition, their blowdown model was implemented. Molkov et al. [23], found that the 
adiabatic blowdown model provided better agreement with experiment than an isothermal approach 
for the initial stage whilst the isothermal blowdown model provided better agreement compared to 
experimental data for high-pressure hydrogen storage (930 bar) in later stages in case of release 
temperature prediction as studied by Cirrone et al. [28] . Thus, an adiabatic model has been used in 
this study to reproduce the hydrogen tank blowdown since only the initial stage of the blowdown 
process was considered. Predicted pressure dynamics for blowdown through 3.34 mm, 2 mm and 
0.5 mm diameters are shown in Fig. 2. 
 
(a)                                                                                    (b) 
 
(c) 
Fig. 2. Tank pressure for adiabatic blowdown from 70 MPa. (a) 3.34 mm diameter TPRD; (b) 2 mm diameter 
TPRD; (c) 0.5 mm diameter TPRD. 
When the TPRD diameter is 3.34 mm for a 117 L tank at 70 MPa, the total blowdown takes over 
138 s and the transition from under-expanded jet to expanded jet occurs at 106 s. In contrast, a 0.5 
mm diameter TPRD requires 6000 s to fully blowdown and 4742 s to transit to an expanded jet. 
These differences have to be accounted for by hydrogen tank designers as they affect the required 
thermal resistance of tank to a fire. It is acknowledged that this presents a significant engineering 
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challenge. Redesign of ventilation systems is also an option. However, this would not eliminate 
problems associated with ignited releases and vehicles would be restricted to use in enclosures that 
had been retrofitted or newly designed, rather than ensuring all uses are inherently safe. 
Volumetric source model 
Decreasing tank pressure during blowdown leads to a corresponding reduction in the notional 
nozzle diameter. In order to avoid constantly changing the release diameter in the CFD calculation, 
a volumetric source approach [23] was implemented in a single cell above the leak. This mimics the 
hydrogen mass inflow by taking mass, momentum, energy, turbulent kinetic energy and turbulent 
dissipation energy data from written for Fluent the User Defined Function (UDF). This approach 
enables changes in the notional nozzle parameters to be reflected in the volumetric sources without 
any change in the release shape and volume. This method was experimentally validated for 
hydrogen releases through a 3 mm diameter [29] and the results were presented in detail in [23]. It 
was demonstrated that a volumetric source equivalent to 4 times (or less) the notional nozzle 
diameter can accurately reproduce concentration decay in the under-expanded jets. All volumetric 
sources used in this study are either equal to or larger than the notional nozzle diameter.  
Grid independency 
In order to comply with the CFD model evaluation protocols [30], three different grids were 
considered (coarse, intermediate, and refined). In each grid refinement, the average length of the 
computational cells was halved inside the car park, particularly in areas where high gradients and 
complex phenomena were expected. Specifically, localised refinement was provided around the 
hydrogen inlet, the ceiling and regions of the enclosure volume for all grids as recommended by 
Baraldi et al. [30]. The study was conducted for case 1 and the mesh details are summarised in 
Table 2. 
Table 2: Mesh details for grid independence study 
Mesh size No. of cells No. of faces No. of nodes 
1. Coarse 479,977 1,639,600 532,532 
2. Intermediate 691,759 2,302,631 745,416 
3. Refine 1,222,412 3,978,771 1,296,276 
It should be noted that only the mesh within the car park was changed in this grid independence 
study since the outer domain does not effect conditions in the initial stages of the release. The 
hydrogen mole fraction was measured at points along the jet axis at increasing height relative to the 
release, results from a flow time of 0.7 s are shown in Fig. 3a. In addition, concentrations were 
recorded for points 0.021 m under the car park ceiling at an increasing radius from the jet axis, these 
results at 0.7 s are shown in  Fig. 3b. 
As seen in Fig. 3b the hydrogen cloud has a radius of 4m at 0.7 s. The grid independence study 
showed no significant changes in the results when a coarser grid is used, yet significant savings 
were made in computational time. Therefore, an “intermediate grid”, as described in Table 2 was 
used in the study to achieve a balance between accuracy and computational time. 
MODEL VALIDATION  
As discussed, no exsisting experimental data exsists for a hydrogen release in a covered car park, 
and limited data exsists for impinging uignited jets. However, experimental data for impinging 
helium jets, produced by KIT-HYKA has been considered for comparison. The experiments were 
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carried out within the H2FC European Infrastructure project (http://www.h2fc.eu/) and have not 
been published in their entirety, however, they are summarised in the work by Dadashzadah et al. 
[31]. The experiments involved blowdown from a 19 l tank at 70 MPa through a release diameter of 
1 mm. The release occurred vertically and impinged on to a plate with dimensions 1.52 x 1.51 m. 
The plate was located 85 cm from the release point. Helium concentration was was measured at 
locations along the surface locations. Two sensors were considered for validation purposes, as 
shown in Fig. 4. Pos 1 was located at a distance of 100 mm distance from the jet axis, and Pos 2 was 
located 250 mm from the jet axis. on the exact axis as the first one. Two steps were taken in the 
validation process; blowdown parameters were compared with those predicted by the Ulster 
blowdown model, then these validated pressure dynamic curves were used as an input to the CFD 
simulation. 
 
(a)                                                                                           (b) 
Fig. 3. Grid independence study for 3.34 mm TPRD diameter with constant release (case 1) at a flow time of 
0.7 s. (a) Hydrogen mole fraction at increasing vertical distance from the leak nozzle along jet axis; 
(b) Hydrogen mole fraction at increasing radial distance from the jet axis at a position 0.021 m under the car 
park ceiling. 
 
Fig. 4. Schematic diagram of KIT experiment for an impinging helium jet. 
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(a)                                                                                  (b) 
Fig. 5. Experimental and numerical predictions. (a) Storage pressure dynamics ; (b) Helium concentration at 
plate surface sensors 
Experimentally measured pressure dynamics at the release point were compared with those 
predicted using the Ulster adiabatic blowdown model with a Discharge Coefficient (PX) of 0.8. 
Good agreement was found between the model predictions and experiment as shown in Fig. 5a. 
A volumetric source model was employed for the helium release in the CFD simulations. A 
hexahedral grid was used with refinement in the region of the nozzle area and plate. An indoor 
environment was considered with dimensions of L x W x H of (25.32 x 7.87 x 10.42) m. A 
comparison of the concentraion measurements at Pos 1 and Pos 2 is given in Fig 5b. Differences are 
within allowable engineering limits, with differences observed of 10 to 12%. It should be noted that 
in the experiments, in order to measure concentration, helium gas was suctioned at the plate surface 
to a helium measuring device along an 80 cm tube, this may be a factor in the time delay observed 
between the experimental measurements at the beginning of the experiment. Differences between 
the numerical prediction and the experiment decreased with increasing time. 
RESULTS 
Previous studies by the authors have focused on unignited and ignited hydrogen release in small 
laboratory-scale enclosures and residential garages to evaluate TPRD diameters, vent position, and 
size, to avoid the safety risk due to the pressure peaking phenomena [10]. Whereas in this work the 
larger vents mean that overpressure is not the most significant hazard. Thus, the focus of this work 
is on the development of a flammable atmosphere for the six cases, with a specific emphasis on 1% 
vol as this represents the maximum allowable mole fraction of hydrogen in an enclosure containing 
hydrogen equipment in accordance to ISO/DIS 19880-1 [14], NFPA 2 [15] and IEC (60079-10) [16] 
standards and guidelines 
Development of flammable atmosphere for constant hydrogen release 
A constant hydrogen release of 0.299 kg/s through a 3.34 mm TPRD diameter as simulated in [24] 
was considered. Current TPRD diameters can range from 2 to 5 mm and 3.34 mm was taken as the 
largest diameter in this study. Whilst this facilitates tank blowdown in a shorter period of time and 
decreases the risk of tank rupture, the hazards for indoor release, where the gas may accumulate 
should be considered. This case represents the worst case scenario considered in this study as 
blowdown is not accounted for. However, accumulation is evident within the first seconds of the 
release before the pressure drop in a blowdown scenario would be significant. It is also indicative of 
what may occur in the event of leaks from other compressed hydrogen gas sources, where pipes and 
tanks may have a leak with a constant release of hydrogen flow for a longer period. Dispersion of 
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hydrogen over the first 20 s of the release can be seen in Fig. 6, the iso-surfaces show the extent of 
the flammable atmosphere (4% vol), and of 25% the LFL (1% vol). Where 1% vol represents the 
maximum allowable mole fraction of hydrogen in an enclosure containing hydrogen equipment in 
accordance to ISO/DIS 19880-1 [14], NFPA 2 [15] and IEC (60079-10) [16] standards and 
guidelines. 
It can be seen from Fig. 6 that within just 20 s hydrogen concentration is 1% vol or higher 
throughout the enclosure, demonstrating that for the particular release, the natural ventilation of the 
car park is incapable of maintaining a hydrogen mole fraction below 1%,  any hydrogen sensors 
present would be activated. It can also be seen how a flammable atmosphere has been formed across 
almost the entire ceiling of the carpark and around the ventilation openings within just 20 s of 
release. Whilst this is a worst case scenario it does highlight potential safety concerns which should 
be taken into account by engineers. 
 
(a)                                                             (b) 
Fig. 6. Hydrogen mole fraction for a constant release of 0.299 kg/s through a 3.34 mm diameter TPRD.  
(a) Iso-surface 1% vol; (b) Iso-surface 4% vol. 
The effect of TPRD diameter on hydrogen dispersion in the car park 
To reflect more realistic scenarios a blowdown model was implemented using the volumetric source 
as described in the previous sections. Three different (3.34 mm, 2 mm, 0.5 mm) TPRD diameters 
were considered and compared with the constant release from 3.34 mm TPRD diameter described 
previously. Iso-surfaces of 1% vol and 2% vol for the various TPRD diameters at 20 s can be seen 
in Fig. 7. In Fig. 8  Iso-surfaces of 4% vol for the various TPRD diameters at 20 s are shown 
representing the LFL. The effect of accounting for blowdown through the 3.34 mm TPRD can be 
clearly seen and is most evident in Fig. 8. 
It can be seen that even when blowdown is accounted for a TPRD  diameter of 3.34 mm can lead to 
safety concerns, with a flammable atmosphere being formed throughout the carpark. In contrast, it is 
shown how a release through a 2 mm diameter TPRD from 700 bar leads to a much smaller 
flammable hydrogen cloud around the release nozzle and under the ceiling. Concentrations of 1% 
vol, are predicted in the vicinity of the vents within 20 s. A 2 mm TPRD diameter led to a 
flammable cloud with a  radius of approximately 5 m above the leak and underneath the ceiling. 
A 0.5 mm TPRD diameter was also investigated and it can be seen from Fig. 9 how a flammable 
cloud is formed in a very limited area above the leak in contrast with the larger diameters 
considered. From Fig. 9 it can be seen how the extent of the flammable atmosphere remains almost 
constant over the initial 20 s of the of the release. Thus, a TPRD diameter of 0.5 mm could be 
considered as an inherently safer diameter for unignited hydrogen release from onboard storage in 
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this case. In contrast, the extent of the hydrogen cloud at 1% continues to grow over 20 s, as shown 
in Fig. 9. 
 
(a)                                                               (b) 
Fig. 7 Hydrogen mole fraction after 20 s for releases from 700 bar through 0.5 mm, 2 mm and 3.34 mm TPRD 
diameters. (a) Iso-surface 1% vol; (b) Iso-surface 2% vol. 
 
Fig. 8. Iso-surface showing 4% hydrogen mole fraction after 20 s for releases from 700 bar through 0.5 mm, 2 
mm and 3.34 mm TPRD diameters. 
 
(a)                                                               (b) 
Fig. 9. Hydrogen mole fraction for a blowdown release from 700 bar through a 0.5 mm TPRD. (a) Iso-surface 
1% vol; (b) Iso-surface 4% vol. 
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Hydrogen release direction from onboard storage in a naturally ventilated covered car park 
In addition to releasing hydrogen through a “pipe” 0.5 m pipe above the car park floor, a car body 
was also considered to represent a more realistic scenario. Two different release directions were 
considered using a 0.5 mm TPRD diameter in order to investigate the effect of release orientation 
and release location. Results for a downward release, from a location under the car beside the rear 
left wheel, are shown in Fig. 10 for 4% hydrogen mole fraction.  
 
Fig. 10. Iso-surface showing 4% hydrogen mole fraction for a downward release from 700 bar through a 0.5 
mm TPRD. 
The maximum flammable envelope was reached at a release time of approximately 15 s, after which 
time the height of the jets at the sides and rear of the car began to reduce, this height reduction is 
observed by 20 s. Since the release was downwards, impinging on the floor, the car wheels 
obstructed some of the flow dispersion, leading to a non-uniform release pattern. H release. Within 
15 s of the release, the flammable envelope covered the rear, left and right of the car in addition to 
regions of the ceiling. This presents a clear safety concern for any passengers in the car in the event 
ignition sources may be present.  Nevertheless, the flammable cloud is relatively small and the 
hydrogen disperses quickly. 
An upward release was also simulated at a height of 1.13 m from the ground, representing the top of 
the car and the results are shown in Fig. 11 for 4% hydrogen mole fraction.  
 
Fig. 11. Iso-surface showing 4% hydrogen mole fraction an upward release from 700 bar through a 0.5 mm 
TPRD. 
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For an upward release the maximum flammable envelope was formed at approximately 20 s, i.e. 5 s 
later than for the downward case. It can be seen from Fig. 11 how the flammable envelope covers a 
comparably larger area beneath the ceiling but is spread over a smaller region surrounding the car, 
and hence has a higher average hydrogen concentration. 
A comparison of the gas envelope development for 1% hydrogen mole fraction for a downward and 
upward release through a 0.5 mm TPRD diameter is shown in Fig. 12.  It is seen how for the 
downward release the envelope of 1% volume is considerably smaller in the region underneath the 
ceiling, however, the car itself is surrounded on three sides by the gas cloud at 1% hydrogen. In 
contrast, the upward release led to a relatively larger envelope of 1% hydrogen in the region beneath 
the ceiling, but a minimal envelope was seen in the vicinity of the car. It should be mentioned that 
both downward and upward releases could be classified as inherently safe if a 0.5 mm TPRD 
diameter is used because the flammable cloud produced is limited in a very small area, 
predominately near the ceiling, and it disperses quickly with continuing tank blowdown. However, 
TPRD diameters larger than 0.5 mm can lead to the more significant flammable cloud in the 
absence of additional ventilation. It should be emphasised that whilst the envelope at 1% vol has not 
reached a maximum at 1%, the flammable zone has already begun to reduce by this time, as 
discussed in the previous section. 
 
                   (a)                                     (b)                              
Fig. 12. Hydrogen release from 700 bar through a 0.5 mm TPRD. (a) Downward release; (b) Upward release. 
CONCLUSIONS  
Unignited hydrogen release from onboard vehicle storage in a naturally ventilated covered car park 
has been considered numerically for the first time. Simulations were carried out for a car park with 
dimensions LxWxH=30x28.6x2.6 m, incorporating two vents which provided an opening equivalent 
in area to 5% of the floor area across two opposing walls in accordance with British Standard BS 
7346-7:2013. Six release cases from 700 bar storage were considered; four upward releases from a 
pipe 0.5 m above the floor,  and a downward and upward release where the car geometry was 
included. A blowdown model, developed at Ulster University [23], was applied for all but one 
constant release scenario. As expected, a constant mass flow rate release resulted in a larger 
flammable cloud compared for a blowdown release through the same TPRD diameter, 
demonstrating the importance of including blowdown for real scenarios. It was demonstrated how a 
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0.5 mm diameter TPRD resulted in a considerably smaller flammable cloud. Concerns have been 
highlighted for ”typical” TPRD diameters and it has been demonstrated how the diameter should be 
reduced as much as is reasonably practicable. In order to investigate a real case scenario, a car body 
geometry was modelled, and downward and upward releases from 700 bar storage through a 0.5 
mm TPRD were compared. The downward release resulted in a larger flammable envelope in the 
vicinity of the car, particularly surrounding the doors and rear. However, the average hydrogen 
concentration within the flammable cloud was lower compared with the upward release. In contrast, 
an upward release let to a greater flammable envelope beneath the ceiling, but not surrounding the 
car. Both downward and upward releases from 700 bar through a 0.5 mm TPRD in a covered car 
park can be considered as inherently safe producing a limited flammable cloud which disperses 
quickly. However, the work does indicate that if larger diameter TPRDs are to be used, then safety 
considerations for an unignited release in a covered car park should be further investigated and 
addressed.  
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